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Abstract 
Tool use requires the manipulation of an object in the environment to achieve a 
goal, and the ability to relate one object to another. In the present experiments, I 
investigated tool use acquisition, and the relationship between tool use and self-control, 
in lion-tailed macaques (Macaca silenus). First, I examined three lion-tailed macaques’ 
abilities to manipulate a tool by presenting a rake-shaped tool resting on a platform, with 
a food reward placed outside of the rake head. This experiment measured the monkeys’ 
abilities to manipulate a rake-shaped tool, and investigated how the monkeys learned the 
tool-using skill. Two monkeys learned to successfully manipulate the tool to obtain the 
reward, while the other did not. In the second experiment, I investigated tool use in 
relation to self-control, by presenting a modified token-exchange task. In a trial, I 
presented one monkey that successfully learned to use the tool with a choice between a 
medium-value reward, and a rake tool that could be used to obtain a higher-value reward. 
If the monkey chose the tool over the food, I pushed a platform with a high-value food 
resting on it up to the caging that could be retrieved using the tool. The monkey began 
choosing the tool over the apple piece significantly more often than chance in his seventh 
20-trial session. My results indicated that this monkey was capable of self-control using 
this novel design, as he chose the tool to retrieve the high-value reward over the low-
value reward, even when there was a delay of up to 10 s between choosing the tool and 
retrieving the reward. This study was one of the first that investigated tool use acquisition 
and response inhibition in lion-tailed macaques. Performance of the two successful lion-
tailed macaques on the tool acquisition task may reflect phylogenetic differences, in that 
   vii 
they performed similar to another Old World monkey species (Macaca fuscata), but 
outperformed marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), a New World monkey species. Their 
capacity for self-control on this task was similar to that seen in both Old and New World 
monkey species. 
1 
Introduction 
Tool use requires the manipulation of an object in the environment to achieve a 
goal, and requires the ability to relate one object to another (Beck, 1980; Fragaszy & 
Cummins-Sebree, 2005; Humle & Fragaszy, 2011). Historically, chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes) were the only non-human species thought to use tools as a regular foraging 
technique in the wild, using branches or stones to crack open nuts, as well as sticks as 
probing tools for insects (St Amant & Horton, 2008; Tomasello & Call, 1997). In fact, 
chimpanzees were the main species that researchers studied to investigate tool use. 
However, more recent studies in the wild have established that capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
libidinosus) and a population of long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) regularly use 
stone tools to crack open nuts and shellfish as a foraging technique (Gumert, Hoong, & 
Malaivijitnond, 2011; Gumert & Malaivijitnond, 2012; Spagnoletti, Visalberghi, Ottoni, 
Izar, & Fragaszy, 2011; Visalberghi et al., 2009). Sumatran orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus 
abelii) have also been seen to use tools in the wild. They use sticks as foraging probe 
tools to obtain insects, honey, or water from trees (Fox, Sitompul, & van Schaik, 1999; 
Humle & Fragaszy, 2011; van Schaik, Fox, & Fechtman, 2003). These studies document 
the tool using capabilities of these species, but under wild conditions it is not feasible to 
investigate the cognitive abilities related to tool use, as experimental methods, such as 
controlled environments, are difficult to ensure in the wild. Studies with captive primates 
are able to address this issue.   
While few primate species use tools in the wild, more species are known to use 
tools in captivity. According to Humle and Fragaszy (2011), the genera that have been 
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repeatedly observed using tools in captivity are the four mentioned above, as well as 
lemurs (Eulemur and Lemur), gorillas (Gorilla), and baboons (Papio). One question that 
is common to tool use research in captive studies is the understanding of causality. In 
other words, researchers have investigated whether or not the primate understands the 
relationship between the tool and the object on which it is acting (Tomasello & Call, 
1997). For example, in one experiment, researchers presented sticks and a clear tube with 
a reward at the center to four capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella; Visalberghi & Trinca, 
1989). The monkeys had to use the sticks to push out and obtain the reward. Three out of 
the four monkeys learned to push the reward out with the provided sticks. Another 
experiment by the same investigator built on this “tube task” (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 
1994), using the same monkeys as their first experiment. In the new experiment, there 
was a small hole (a trap) that would not allow the reward to be pushed out in that 
direction without falling in the hole, where it could not be retrieved. The monkey had to 
use the stick to push the food out in the opposite direction of the trap to obtain the 
reward.  The trap was always in the center of the tube, so the reward was always placed 
offset to the left or right of the trap to begin a trial. Three of the four monkeys were not 
successful at the trap tube, and performed at chance levels. These monkeys used a side 
bias in most of the trials, and inserted the stick in only one side. The remaining monkey 
was successful at the task, and changed the sides into which she inserted the stick. 
However, the researchers found that this monkey was using a distance based strategy, as 
she inserted the stick on the side that was farthest from the reward to obtain it, and did 
not fully understand the causal relationship between the trap position and the reward. In 
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other words, the monkey was only attending to the side of the tube on which the food 
reward was placed. She never pushed the food toward the center of the tube, and would 
always avoid pushing the reward toward the trap. She did this even if the trap was 
inverted on the top of the tube, which therefore would have no effect on the movement of 
the reward. The monkey generalized its movement to always push away from the trap. 
The monkey’s behavior indicated that it did not understand the full relationship between 
the trap position and the reward. If the monkey truly understood, it would take the 
position of the trap into account, and know if the tube was inverted, it could still receive 
the food if it was pushed in that direction.   
In another experiment, researchers presented a transparent tube with a reward at 
the center that could only be pushed out with a straight stick (Visalberghi, Fragaszy, & 
Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995). They gave subjects, which included capuchins, chimpanzees, 
bonobos (Pan paniscus), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), one of three stick types to 
attempt the task: straight, H-shaped, and a stick bundle. They presented the straight stick 
in the first experimental condition, as it was the easiest for the animals to use to push the 
food out of the tube. The last two conditions included the H-shaped stick and the stick 
bundle. For the animals to be successful, they had to modify the sticks. The H-shaped 
sticks had two extra small pegs at each end of the larger dowel, which the animals had to 
bite and pull off. The bundle of sticks consisted of four dowels attached with tape that 
were too thick to be inserted into the tube, which the animals had to pull apart. All of the 
species could use the straight stick successfully within five weeks. Only the great apes 
could modify the other sticks successfully to obtain the reward with limited errors. The 
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capuchins were able to eventually learn all of the tasks, but continued to make errors on 
the H-shaped stick and stick bundle tasks (Visalberghi et al., 1995). These tube 
experiments, and others, seemed to indicate that great ape species are the only non-
human primates that understand the causal relations between tools and the objects on 
which the tools interact (Sabbatini et al., 2012; Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994). 
Other experiments have been more successful at investigating causal 
relationships. In an influential study, Hauser (1997) designed a two-choice tool task to 
examine whether cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), which are a species that do not 
use tools in the wild, understood the relationship between a hook-shaped cane tool and 
the raking in of a food reward. In this experiment, the researcher presented two hook-
shaped tools on a platform in front of the tamarins. One of the canes was baited with food 
inside the hook, and the other cane was not baited, and food was outside the hook. Hauser 
ran 12 trials in each testing session, using various configurations. To succeed at the task, 
the monkey needed to pull in the tool with the food inside the hook. The monkeys tended 
to choose the baited hook. According to Hauser, the results indicated that the tamarins 
chose according to the functional characteristics of the tools, not extraneous 
characteristics, so they understood the relation between the tool and the object. 
Similar experiments that replicated Hauser’s (1997) design have been conducted 
with vervets (Cercopithecus aethiops), two species of lemurs (Eulemur fulvus and Lemur 
catta), capuchins, marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), and lion-tailed macaques (Fujita, 
Kuroshima, & Asai, 2003; Fujita, Sato, & Kuroshima, 2011; Judge & Haverly, 
unpublished data; Santos, Mahajan, & Barnes, 2005; Santos, Pearson, Spaepen, Tsao, & 
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Hauser, 2006; Spaulding & Hauser, 2005). Santos et al. (2006) replicated the Hauser 
(1997) study with vervet monkeys and cotton-top tamarins. Their results were similar to 
Hauser, in that both the vervets and the tamarins learned the two-choice tool task, 
however, there was an interspecies difference. The vervets learned the task faster than the 
tamarins did. This study introduced a condition of intact versus broken cane tools, in 
which the vervets were more likely to choose the intact cane than were the tamarins. As a 
result, there may be a possible difference between Old World monkeys, like vervets, and 
New World monkeys, like tamarins, in regards to tool-using comprehension. Overall, the 
results of Santos and coauthors' (2006) experiments indicated that the non-tool using 
vervets performed similarly on these tasks compared to other tool-using primates. They 
proposed that the vervets in their study performed at the level of chimpanzees in other 
studies. It is clear that comparative studies on tool use in different species are important, 
as they contribute to the understanding the phylogenetic development of tool use 
comprehension. 
Spaulding and Hauser (2005) replicated the Hauser (1997) study with cotton-top 
tamarins and common marmosets, but they introduced a new condition with moveable 
tools. The moveable tool condition involved requiring the monkeys to move and 
reposition the tools to obtain the food item. Both the already positioned tool and the 
moveable tool were effective but the already positioned tool was easier to manipulate. 
They found that, initially, the tamarins did not show any preference for the already 
positioned tools over the tools that needed to be moved even though they did not 
reposition them and, thus, did not receive the reward. However, the marmosets eventually 
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learned to select the already positioned functional tools to obtain the food item with it. On 
the other hand, the tamarins chose each of the tools at chance levels, and could not 
retrieve the food item with the moveable or non-functional (flimsy rope or rubber 
material) tools. Therefore, the marmosets were able to attend to the functional 
characteristics of the tools, like the tool position, but the tamarins did not attend to the 
functional characteristics. They found an interesting species difference, as tamarins and 
marmosets are closely related species.  
Santos et al. (2005) replicated the Hauser (1997) study on two species of lemurs, 
the brown lemur (Eulemur fulvus) and the ring-tailed lemur (Lemur catta). Like 
Spaulding and Hauser (2005), they also introduced a condition in which the lemurs 
needed to reposition the tool. They found that their subjects were all successful at 
choosing a tool positioned to obtain a reward, but were not able to successfully reposition 
the tools to obtain the food reward. Their experiments provide the first evidence for tool 
comprehension in lemurs, but like tamarins and marmosets, these non-tool using species 
did not reposition the tool. Overall, these studies support that some non-tool using species 
can understand object-tool relations, but they are not able to reposition tools. 
Fujita et al. (2003) replicated the Hauser (1997) study with four capuchin 
monkeys. Like the previous reports, they wanted to investigate whether monkeys 
understood causal relationships. All of the monkeys were successful at the two-choice 
tool pulling tasks. The authors then introduced two more testing conditions, barrier tests 
and trap tests. The barrier test consisted of small blocks attached to the testing surface. 
These were placed in various orientations that prevented the monkey from pulling in the 
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food reward with one of the tools. The trap test was similar, but had small holes cut into 
the testing surface that prevented the retrieval of the reward with one of the tools, as 
pulling the tool would cause the food to fall into the hole. These conditions tested the 
monkeys' ability to understand the relationships among three objects, the reward, the tool, 
and an obstacle in the environment. Both of these experiments consisted of only two 
sessions of 12 trials each, and no monkey responded significantly over chance in this 
number of trials. Results indicated that the monkeys could not spontaneously understand 
the causal relationship involving the three elements. However, the researchers retested the 
capuchins using tools to obtain the reward, while avoiding a barrier or a trap on the 
testing platform (Fujita et al., 2011). The monkeys learned the task in approximately ten 
twelve-trial sessions. Results suggested that the capuchins learned to select the correct 
tool in this two-choice task while taking three factors into consideration: the position of 
the reward relative to the tool, and the position of the reward relative to the barrier or 
trap.  
All of the experiments reported here indicated that the Hauser two-choice method 
is a successful test of understanding of tool-object relations in a variety of species. 
Researchers have proposed that this two-choice cane task is inherently simpler than the 
tube task, as instead of pushing the food away, animals pull food towards them. Also, the 
pulling action can be performed by species that do not frequently manipulate objects or 
even use tools, which makes the task a sufficient measure of tool and object relationship 
comprehension for many different animal species. While the methods in these studies do 
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not strictly fit the definition of tool use, they may provide information on how animals 
learn to use tools, and the aspects of the tool to which they attend. 
 While these two-choice experiments are adequate to examine understanding of 
object relations in a variety of species, they do not investigate how animals learn to use 
tools. Tool use acquisition can be investigated by allowing animals to act freely on 
objects with tools to examine how animals learn to use them. Some studies analyze the 
neurological changes that are related to tool use learning in macaques, while others focus 
on analyzing the physical behavior (Quallo, Kraskov, & Lemon, 2012; Quallo et al., 
2009). For example, Ishibashi, Hihara, and Iriki (2000) allowed four Japanese macaques 
(Macaca fuscata) to use a rake-shaped tool, and investigated whether the monkeys 
spontaneously learned how to use the tool. They also investigated whether the monkeys 
learned through insight or trial and error. Insight can be defined as an almost immediate 
comprehension. The authors classified learning as insight if the monkeys quickly learned 
to use the tool within the first few trials with few mistakes. Trial and error consists of 
repeated attempts and association learning to achieve success. The authors classified 
learning as trial and error if the monkeys took more than a few trials to learn the tools, or 
tried different movements while using the tools (Ishibashi et al., 2000). Tests for the 
development of tool use competency included a training condition followed by three 
testing conditions. In the training condition, a food item was placed within the rake on a 
platform, so that just pulling the tool would retrieve the reward. In the first testing 
condition, the food item was placed to the left side of the platform, away from the tool, 
with the tool in the center of the platform. In the second testing condition, the food item 
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was placed to the right side of the platform with the tool in the center. In each of these 
conditions, the monkey had to move the tool away to the left or the right of their body to 
obtain the reward. In the third testing condition, the food was in the center of the 
platform, and the tool was to the right. In order to successfully retrieve the reward in this 
condition, the monkeys needed to move their arms and elbows in a lateral direction. In 
addition to these test trials, the researchers also included some trials in each testing 
session in which the tool was presented with the rake head facing the monkey. This 
condition further investigated the monkeys’ comprehension of the rake as a tool.  
The experimenters classified the results as comprising three stages. Stage 1 was 
the training trials and over the first few trials of the experiment, two of the monkeys 
learned to pull in food that was in contact with the tool. The other two monkeys saw the 
tool as an obstacle to the food, and tried to move it out of the way. Eventually, after about 
1,400 trials, all the monkeys could use the tool to pull in the food, however, they were 
only able to pull in food that was between the monkey's body and the tool. On the 
seventh day of the experiment (stage 2), the experimenters introduced the testing 
conditions. At the start of this stage, the monkeys could not maneuver the tool to pull in 
food lateral to the tool, and gave up after failure. As testing continued at around the ninth 
day for a total of 1,800 trials, the monkeys exhibited more manipulative behavior, like 
moving the tool laterally towards the food. The increase in new actions increased the 
success rate of retrieving the food. As learning increased, the success rate increased. After 
day 13, or total of 2,600 trials, termed stage 3, they developed smoother movements. 
These results seemed to indicate that the monkeys understood how the tool interacted 
   10 
with the food and how to better use the tool over time. However, there were limitations to 
their understanding. They never learned to reposition the tool if it was presented head 
first, they just grasped the head and attempted to use the nonfunctional end to obtain the 
food item, illustrating some limitations in their comprehension. In the final condition of 
the experiment, the researchers presented new ring-shaped tools consisting of a long shaft 
connected to a circular head that differed in length and weight from the original tool, to 
measure the monkeys’ reactions. The monkeys were able to learn to use these new tools 
within a few minutes. Two of the monkeys suddenly used the tool and pulled in the food 
reward, after attempting to grab directly for the food. The researchers proposed this was 
due to insightful behavior. The monkeys did not exhibit much hesitation to use the new 
tools, and this was categorized as insight. However, the monkeys learned to increase their 
success with lateral movement and pushing, through trial and error.  
Similar to the Ishibashi et al. (2000) paper, Yamazaki et al. (2011) systematically 
trained five common marmosets to use rake-shaped tools. They presented a tool, with an 
adjacent food item, that the marmosets had to learn to retrieve. The researchers 
incorporated a preliminary stage, and four training stages in their experiment. In the 
preliminary stage, Yamazaki et al. (2011) habituated the marmosets to the tool and the 
food reward by placing the food item on the tip of the rake. This encouraged the 
marmosets to pull on the rake. After the animals consistently pulled the rake, the 
researchers started stage 1. In this stage, the food item was placed in various positions, all 
in front of the rake head. Therefore, the marmosets only needed to pull straight towards 
them to obtain the reward. In stage 2, the food item was placed in various positions under 
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and to the left or right of the rake head, so the monkeys had to move the tool horizontally 
and then pull towards them to obtain the food item. In stage 3, the food item was placed 
in positions above and to the left or right of the rake head. The marmosets had to move 
the tool away from them first, and then move the tool left or right, before pulling the tool 
back toward them to retrieve the food item. In the fourth stage, the food items were 
placed in positions behind the rake head, and the monkeys had to move the tool to the left 
or the right first, then away from them, to position around the food item. Once the 
marmosets positioned the tool so the food was in front of the rake head, they had to pull 
the tool towards them to obtain the food reward. The criterion to move onto the next stage 
was five consecutive successful trials (Yamazaki et al., 2011). 
All five marmosets completed all four stages, and the researchers concluded that 
they were trained to use the tool (Yamazaki et al., 2011). However, the average time to 
completion of each phase differed depending on the subject and the training stage. The 
researchers reported significant individual differences in the number of trials, from 
around 7,000 to 11,000, needed to reach the criterion for success among all monkeys. As 
the monkeys passed through the tests, the time to retrieve the food reward decreased in all 
monkeys. In other words, their performance improved as the monkeys gained more 
experience with the tools. The results of this study indicated that, with much shaping, 
marmosets were capable of using and repositioning tools. 
Cunningham, Anderson, and Mootnick (2006) assessed whether gibbons could 
learn to use rake tools without training. In their experiment, they presented a rake-shaped 
tool resting on a platform to five gibbons. The rake was out of the gibbons’ reach, but 
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unlike Ishibashi et al. (2000) it was baited with a food reward always in front of the head 
of the rake. Therefore, the gibbons never had to reposition the tools, only pull them 
forward. Each animal had 45 minutes to gain the reward in each trial, and they gave each 
gibbon ten trials over two days. They found that all four gibbons obtained the reward on 
the first trial within the time limit (Cunningham et al., 2006). The average time to 
solution was 57.21 s in the first trial. The gibbons improved in subsequent trials, as the 
mean time to solution decreased. Therefore, their results provide evidence that gibbons 
can spontaneously learn to pull in tools to retrieve a food item. However, the researchers 
never presented a test in which the gibbons needed to reposition the tools. These studies 
document tool use acquisition in macaques, marmosets, and gibbons, and show that some 
species can reposition tools in order to retrieve a food item. Both Old World monkeys, 
like macaques, and New World Monkeys, like marmosets, learned to reposition the tools, 
however the marmosets required extensive training, perhaps suggesting a difference 
between Old and New World species. 
Tool use clearly involves some ability for future directed thought, as animals need 
to be capable of anticipating the outcome of using a tool on an object. For example, 
thinking about arm movements and how to control the tool to retrieve the food in the 
above studies, or using a stone to crack open a nut. Tool use studies are widely used to 
study non-human animals’ abilities for forethought and planning (e.g., Dekleva, van den 
Berg, Spruijt, & Sterck, 2012; Evans & Westergaard, 2006; Judge & Bruno, 2012; 
Mulcahy & Call, 2006; Osvath & Osvath, 2008). The ability to think about the future is 
an aspect of planning. Planning can be defined by two central concepts. In order for an 
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animal to plan, it must display response inhibition, or self-control, in that it gives up 
immediate drives to obtain rewards in the future. A second concept is mental time travel, 
which is the ability to place itself mentally forwards or backwards in time (Osvath & 
Osvath, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008). However, it has been historically claimed 
that non-human animals are not capable of true planning, in that they cannot use flexible 
cognitive thinking beyond their present needs, and are thus unable to place themselves in 
the future (Osvath & Osvath, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008). This view is referred 
to as the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis (Paxton & Hampton, 2009; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007), and it remains controversial. While some previous studies have reported that some 
non-human animals are capable of mental time travel, some researchers state that these 
experiments are flawed, and do not provide evidence of mental time travel in these 
animals. (Mulcahy & Call, 2006; Osvath & Osvath, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2008). For example, Osvath and Osvath (2008) reported strong evidence that orangutans 
and chimpanzees are capable of true planning. However, other research is still conflicted 
on the issue of planning in non-human animals, particularly on future mental time travel 
(Dekleva, et al., 2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008; Paxton & Hampton, 2009). It is 
difficult to measure whether or not animals have flexible cognition to think about future 
scenarios, as it is hard to measure this based on behavior. Other experiments have 
concentrated on response inhibition, or the self-control aspect of planning. These 
simplified tests only measure one of the components of planning but are valuable from a 
comparative evolutionary perspective because they help trace rudimentary forms of 
planning. 
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It has been established that self-control is one of the components involved in 
planning, and it can be defined as giving up immediate rewards to obtain rewards in the 
future (Osvath & Osvath, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008). This ability is involved 
in planning, as it is preparing for a future event (Beran, Savage-Rumbaugh, Pate, & 
Rumbaugh, 1999). Self-control, or delayed gratification, is also applicable in natural 
behavior in the wild, like foraging behavior. Animals can use this to assess the costs and 
benefits to forage or search for different foods (Beran et al., 1999). For example, it is 
possible for an animal to have immediate access to a lower-nutrient food source, like 
leaves, but forego this food source to spend a longer time foraging for higher-nutrient 
food source, like fruit. Past research indicates that chimpanzees, capuchins, and rhesus 
macaques exhibit self-control behavior (Beran & Evans, 2006; Beran & Evans, 2012; 
Evans & Beran, 2007; Evans & Westergaard, 2006; Judge & Bruno, 2012; Judge & 
Essler, 2013). In the wild, chimpanzees and capuchins transport tools over distances to 
appropriate feeding sites (Seed & Byrne, 2010). Transporting tools indicates some form 
of planning, as the animal has to remember the location of the food to be processed, as 
well as the location of the stone tools and anvils. Food acquisition with tools involves 
self-control, as time and effort is needed to use the tool to obtain the food inside. In terms 
of costs and benefits, this time and effort using tools could have been used to forage for a 
larger amount of less valuable or less protein-rich food (Beran et al., 1999). 
According to Evans and Beran (2007), there are two aspects of self-control, delay 
choice and delay maintenance. Delay choice refers to the selection of a delayed reward 
over an immediate reward. For example, forgoing a small, immediate payment to wait to 
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receive a larger, delayed sum of money is delay choice. The delay choice paradigm is also 
called the inter-temporal choice task (Berns, Laibson, & Loewenstein, 2007; Evans, 
Perdue, Parrish, & Beran, 2014). Delay maintenance refers to maintaining the original 
choice, while still having access to the immediate reward throughout the task (Evans & 
Beran, 2007). Clearly, experimental tasks that measure delay choice would be different 
than tasks for delay maintenance. An example of a delay choice task would be presenting 
a choice between an immediate lesser value reward and a delayed higher-value reward. 
The subjects would need to make a single response, and would not be able to modify 
their choice (Evans & Beran, 2007). Self-control would be measured through that first 
choice. An example of a delay maintenance task would be that an immediate reward 
would be available, and the subject would be allowed to change their initial choice. Self-
control would be measured by how long the subject could continuously inhibit choosing 
the immediate reward, and the higher-value reward would be obtained only after an entire 
delay period. Another version of the delay maintenance task is an accumulation task, in 
which the researcher presents rewards one by one. As long as the subject does not take 
the accumulating rewards, they will receive a larger reward after it has accumulated. Each 
of these, the delay choice task, the delay maintenance task, and the accumulation task, 
has been done in variety of species, for example, chimpanzees, capuchins, rhesus 
macaques, and long-tailed macaques, indicating that these species are capable of self-
control. (Beran & Evans, 2006; Beran & Evans, 2012; Beran et al., 2014; Evans & Beran, 
2007; Evans et al., 2014; Beran et al., 1999; Szalda-Petree et al. 2004; Tobin, Logue, 
Chelonis, Ackerman, & May, 1996).  
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Szalda-Petree et al. (2004) conducted a version of the delay choice task to test 
whether rhesus macaques displayed self-control. The experimenters presented three 
macaques with a touch screen computer program. The program gave the monkeys a 
choice between stimuli associated with a smaller, immediate reward (two cereal pieces) 
or a larger, delayed reward (six cereal pieces). The researchers found that all three 
macaques chose the delayed, larger reward significantly above chance, which indicated 
some form of self-control in these animals. Beran et al. (1999) conducted a delay 
maintenance task with chimpanzees. First, the chimpanzees were trained to press a button 
to indicate that they wanted the food item. In the delay maintenance task, the researchers 
presented the chimpanzees with a choice between a more preferred food and a less 
preferred food at the same time in separate bowls. The chimpanzees were given the less 
preferred food if they pressed the button before the end of the delay. They were given the 
more preferred food if they did not press the button (Beran et al., 1999). Overall, the 
chimpanzees succeeded in waiting until the delay ended, in at least some of the trials, 
which indicated that they were capable of self-control.  
Evans and Beran (2007) conducted a study, with two experiments, on delayed 
gratification in nine rhesus macaques. They used an accumulation design to determine 
whether the macaques could stop themselves reaching for food in a container, a measure 
of self-control. In this accumulation design, the researchers sequentially deposited single 
food items into a container, which accumulated until the monkeys took the food rewards. 
The longer the individual was able to wait, the more rewards were accumulated. In the 
first experiment, they presented food rewards, individually into a bowl near to the 
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monkey, until the monkey started to eat the food. In one phase, the food items were 
highly preferred (grapes), and in the second phase, most of the items were low value 
(celery pieces), but one high-value food was given at some point in the trial. The 
experimenters found that the majority of the macaques were not very successful at the 
task, in that they did not exercise self-control and wait for items to accumulate (Evans & 
Beran, 2007). Because of this, they modified the tests for the second experiment. 
 In the second experiment, the researchers presented the same macaques with a 
choice between the less valued food available at the start and throughout the trial, and a 
highly preferred food that was available after a delay (Evans & Beran, 2007). They first 
transferred a single celery piece (low value) into the bowl, and then a single grape. The 
delay between the presentations of the two items varied from 5 s up to 30 s, in 5 s 
increments. If the monkey delayed choosing the celery, to wait for the grape, for the 30 s 
trials, they increased the delay from 40 s up to 120 s, in 10 s increments. Four monkeys 
delayed choosing the celery for 30 s in at least one trial. These same monkeys also 
delayed choosing the celery for 120 s, the longest delay interval. Based on these results, 
four monkeys were able to use self-control to retrieve the most valued reward. It 
appeared that the type of experimental procedure was very important in measuring the 
monkeys' abilities for delayed gratification. The authors also noted that there were 
species differences in self-control. The macaques in this experiment did not show a delay 
as long as chimpanzees and human children in other studies (Beran & Evans, 2006; 
Evans & Beran, 2007). These experiments used versions of the delay choice tasks and the 
delay maintenance tasks to provide evidence that macaques and chimpanzees are capable 
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of some form of delayed gratification. Overall, these studies, and others, provide 
evidence that delayed gratification abilities could span across Old World and New World 
primates (Beran & Evans, 2006; Evans & Beran, 2007; Beran et al., 1999; Evans et al., 
2014; Szalda-Petree et al., 2004).  
However, there are some problems with the traditional delay choice and delay 
maintenance tasks, particularly when they include a choice between a larger and smaller 
amount of food. One main problem is that some animals have difficulty choosing a 
smaller amount of food, in relation to a larger amount (Beran & Evans, 2006; Beran et 
al., 2014). It may be difficult to determine whether the animal is choosing the delayed, 
larger amount because it is exhibiting self-control, or just pointing to the larger quantity. 
As a result, other types of experiments on self-control have been done to adjust for these 
problems, like tool use studies and token exchange tasks.  
Some experiments analyzed self-control and the choice between a tool and an 
immediate reward (Evans & Westergaard, 2006; Osvath & Osvath, 2008). Evans and 
Westergaard presented capuchin monkeys with rod-shaped food items for the monkeys to 
transport to obtain peanut butter from a tube apparatus. The “tools” were pretzel rods and 
celery sticks, a high- and low- value food, respectively. They hypothesized that some of 
the monkeys would refrain from eating the food to use the food as tools, and therefore 
exhibit self-control. There were three conditions in their experiment: a baited-near 
condition, a baited-far condition, and an unbaited condition. The unbaited condition was 
when the apparatus was not filled with peanut butter. In the baited-near and unbaited 
conditions, the monkey was given the tool about 1 m from the apparatus, and it took 
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around 5 s to for the monkey to reach the apparatus. In the baited-far condition, the 
monkey was given the tool about 10 m from the apparatus, and it took the monkey 10 to 
15 s to reach the apparatus. The authors found that 18 out of 20 monkeys exhibited some 
form of self-control. For example, in the unbaited condition, the monkeys chose to eat the 
tool immediately, but in the baited-near and baited-far conditions, most monkeys chose to 
use the rods as a tool. Clearly, these monkeys exhibited self-control, as they gave up an 
immediately available reward (pretzel or celery stick) for a preferred, delayed reward 
(peanut butter). 
Additional studies on self-control have been conducted using a token exchange 
paradigm. Token exchange consists of presenting an object to a monkey and if the 
monkey returns the object, they receive a reward. Judge and Essler (2013) used a token 
exchange task to test for response-inhibition, or self-control, in capuchin monkeys. They 
trained the monkeys to exchange tokens for food rewards that were worth different 
values. They tested for self-control, by presenting a monkey with a token associated with 
a lower-value food. If the monkey exchanged the token, the monkey was given a choice 
between the lower-value reward associated with the token, or another token that was 
associated with a high-value food. If the monkey chose the high-value token, they could 
exchange it for the high-value reward. The experimenters found that out of seven 
capuchins tested, two consistently exhibited self-control, as they chose the high-value 
tokens over the lower-value food. They noted that using tokens, instead of actual food 
items, to hold may have improved their capacity for self-control (Judge & Essler, 2013).  
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Beran and Evans (2012) used a similar token exchange method to test self-control 
in chimpanzees. The experimenters presented three chimpanzees with a choice between 
food items and lexigram tokens that were associated with high-value food items. When 
given a choice between a lower-value food item and a lexigram token that could be 
exchanged for a higher-value food, two of the three chimpanzees learned to make the 
response that led to the more preferred food, within 30 sessions, or 120 trials. The results 
of both these token exchange studies indicated that chimpanzees and capuchins do exhibit 
self-control in choosing exchangeable tokens over immediate food rewards. 
In my research, I investigated elements of tool use behavior, and how lion-tailed 
macaques learned to manipulate and use rake-shaped tools. From the previously 
summarized research, there is much evidence that macaque species closely related to the 
lion-tailed macaques use tools. For example, long-tailed macaques habitually use stones 
as tools in the wild (Malaivijitnond et al., 2007). To examine lion-tailed macaques’ 
abilities to manipulate a rake-shaped tool, I used a method similar to Cunningham, et al. 
(2006) and Ishibashi et al. (2000), in that I presented a rake-shaped tool resting on a 
platform, with a food reward just inside of the head during one training phase. Four 
testing conditions consisted of the food item being placed to either side of the rake tool 
and outside of the head. The experiment measured the monkeys’ abilities to manipulate a 
rake-shaped tool, and also investigated whether the monkeys learned the tool-using skill 
through insight or trial and error. If the monkeys quickly learned to use the tool within the 
first few trials and did not continue to make any errors, they might have been learning 
through insight. However, if they took more than a few trials to learn to use the tools, or 
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tried different movements while using the tools, they might have been learning through 
trial and error (Ishibashi et al., 2000). From the previous studies on tool use acquisition, I 
hypothesized that lion-tailed macaques would be successful at the tool use acquisition 
task, and that they would perform comparably to other macaque species, such as Japanese 
macaques, and better than New World primates, such as marmosets.  
I also incorporated tool use into a test of self-control. Previous studies have shown 
other macaque species are capable of self-control (Evans & Beran, 2007; Evans et al, 
2014; Tobin et al., 1996; Szalda-Petree et al., 2004). To examine their understanding of 
delayed gratification in relation to tool use, I used a method similar to Evans and Beran 
(2012), Judge and Essler (2013), and Osvath and Osvath (2008) that incorporated an 
exchange task. I presented the macaques with a choice between a medium value reward, 
and a rake tool that could be used to obtain a higher-value reward. If the monkey chose 
the food reward, the trial was over. If the monkey chose the tool, I pushed a platform with 
a high-value food resting on it, that they could retrieve using the tool. The goal was to 
determine whether the monkey would take the immediate reward or instead use self-
control to take the tool, which could then be used to obtain a higher-value reward. From 
the previous studies on self-control, I hypothesized that lion-tailed macaques would be 
successful at using the rake tool to retrieve the higher value reward, thereby exhibiting 
some capacity for self-control, similar to capuchins, rhesus macaques, long-tailed 
macaques, and chimpanzees.   
Overall, my research would contribute to the existing information on tool use and 
self-control. This study was one of few studies that investigated tool use acquisition with 
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these procedures in primates. Second, this was the first study to incorporate the option of 
a tool in an exchange task to test for self-control. Lastly, these were the first such studies 
on lion-tailed macaques, a rarely tested species. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Subjects and housing. The subjects were three male lion-tailed macaques, Burt 
(20 years old), Pierre (22 years old), and Ranier (25 years old). All three were born into a 
large mixed-sex group at the San Diego Zoo, raised in captivity, and transferred to the 
same large same-sex group when they reached sexual maturity. Five of these macaques 
were transferred to Bucknell University in 2002 and housed together as a group. The 
subjects were three remaining monkeys of the original five. The animals were housed in 
an indoor/outdoor enclosure, consisting of a 9 m x 11 m x 4.5 m outdoor space and a 9 m 
x 6 m x 2.25 m indoor enclosure, at Bucknell University’s Animal Behavior lab. Walls 
were made of cinderblock and chain link fencing. Indoor floors were poured cement and 
the outdoor section was gravel substrate. The indoor housing was subdivided into three 3 
m x 6 m x 2.5 m sections. The indoor compartments could be separated from the others 
by a sliding metal door, and each one had a metal door that opened up to the outdoor 
enclosure. Both the indoor and outdoor enclosures had perches, swings, and metal 
climbing structures to allow naturalistic movement (Judge, Evans, Schroepfer, & Gross, 
2011). Two of the monkeys were housed socially, and the other was singly-housed, due to 
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incompatibility with the other two. Food, water, and enrichment items were provided ad 
libitum. These animals had previously participated in two-choice tool tasks, and were 
experienced at pulling rod-like tools (Judge & Haverly, unpublished data). However, they 
had not experienced rake tools. The experimental procedures were approved by Bucknell 
University’s Institutional Care and Use Committee (IACUC) and adhered to guidelines in 
the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals (Committee for the Update of the 
Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, 2011). 
  Apparatus. The rake-shaped tools were constructed with a PVC pipe or metal 
base (34 cm long) and a plastic or metal head (18 cm wide), and were painted dark blue 
(see Figure 1). The metal tool also had a cable that attached it to the apparatus to prevent 
the monkeys from pulling it into their enclosure. The metal tool was used by Pierre and 
Ranier because these two monkeys would always pull in the plastic tool and break it 
apart. The testing apparatus consisted of a wooden wheeled platform (61.0 cm x 61.0 
cm). On the front of the platform there were two vertical posts of wood (61 x 10.2 cm) 
with slots on the inside, containing a removable, opaque sheet of Plexiglas resting in the 
slots (0.64 cm width, 63.5 cm x 49.5 cm; see Figure 2). This was necessary to obstruct 
the macaques’ view while each trial was prepared, so my hand movements and reward 
placements did not influence the monkeys’ choices. I started out using red licorice pieces 
as rewards, but this did not seem to motivate the monkeys, as they were not coming up to 
test. I switched to peanuts for Bert, and pieces of fruit and grain bars for Pierre and 
Ranier. After I switched, each monkey would consistently come up to test. 
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Procedures. To start my experiment, my goal was to allow the three macaques to 
manipulate and use a rake-shaped tool. First, I gave them one trial with the rake directly 
behind the food item to re-acclimate them to this type of tool task. All that was necessary 
was for the monkey to pull the rake toward them to obtain the reward in this training trial. 
Next, I moved on to testing. Testing took place five to seven days a week, and sessions 
consisted of 16 trials. To start a trial, I presented a T-shaped rake next to a food reward on 
the testing platform. After a delay of about 10 s, during which the monkeys could observe 
the objects on the platform, I pushed the testing surface close to the front of the 
enclosures. In Bert’s enclosure, he could reach between 4 cm bars, a space approximately 
5 cm wide. In Pierre’s and Ranier’s enclosure, they reached through an enlarged testing 
opening in the fence, approximately 40 cm wide by 30 cm tall separated by 12 squares of 
wire, each 10 cm by 10 cm. Each trial ended when the monkey obtained the food, 
stopped trying to use the tool, or if the food was moved to a distance too far to reach with 
the tool. There were four testing conditions (see Figure 3). In the first condition, the food 
item was placed to the left side of the platform, outside the rake head, with the tool in the 
center. In the second condition, the food item was placed to the right side of the platform, 
outside the rake head, with the tool in the center. In each of these conditions, the monkey 
had to move the tool away from their body. In the third condition, the food was in the 
center of the platform, outside the rake head, and the tool was on the left. In the fourth 
condition, the food was in the center of the platform, outside the rake head, and the tool 
was on the right. Each of these four conditions was pseudo-randomized for each testing 
session, and had no more than four of each condition in a session. I started the first trials 
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with the reward about 1 cm away from the tool head. If an animal was successful at 1 cm, 
I gradually increased the distance until the reward was about 7 cm from the rake. I 
increased the distance to test the monkeys’ range of ability to reposition tools. Testing 
continued until the monkeys successfully retrieved the food item significantly above 
chance in two consecutive sessions. All of the testing was videotaped to analyze the 
monkeys’ movements and skill at using the rakes. 
Data analysis. The criterion to analyze whether the macaques were successful in 
retrieving the food, and whether tool use acquisition was successful, was a retrieval rate 
of 13 out of 16 trials in two consecutive sessions. According to a binomial distribution, 
the two-tailed probability of retrieving the food item 13 out of 16 times would be p = 
0.021, so these upper and lower boundaries would be statistically significant, and lower 
than expected by chance (alpha = 0.05). 
Results and Discussion 
One monkey, Ranier, never reached criterion (13 out of 16 successes, in two 
consecutive sessions). Ranier had 35 sessions, for a total of 560 trials. Ranier’s highest 
rate of retrieving the food item was 5 out of 16 (see Figure 4). Ranier consistently pulled 
the tool straight back towards him, and rarely moved the tool to either side. When he was 
using the plastic tool, he would pull very hard, and either break the tool or take it into the 
enclosure. When I introduced the metal tool in session 8, he would still try to pull it in. 
He was stopped from pulling by the cable, which I introduced in session 19. Ranier also 
tried to knock the tool out of the way and reach for the food item. However, Ranier was 
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able to occasionally retrieve the rewards because in moving the tool out of the way, he 
would sometimes move the food item into reach.  I stopped testing Ranier after 560 trials, 
as he showed no sign of improvement. 
The other two monkeys, Pierre and Bert, reached criterion. Pierre reached 
criterion in session 38, after 608 trials, with 15 out of 16 correct (p = 0.001; see Figure 5). 
Pierre started out similarly to Ranier. When he used the plastic tool, he pulled it straight 
towards him, and also tried to pull it into the enclosure. When I switched to the metal tool 
in session 12, he still tried to pull the tool in. Pierre’s performance improved slightly 
when I introduced the cable in session 21. As he was impeded from pulling the tool into 
the enclosure, he occasionally started moving the tool to either side. He would still knock 
the tool out of the way to reach for the food item. His movements were very erratic, and 
while sometimes he would surround the food item and pull it in, he would also push the 
food item off the sides or the back of the apparatus, and could not retrieve it. He started 
consistently retrieving the food item in session 38, but his movements were still erratic. 
Once he reached criterion, I increased the distance between the food item and tool to 
around 2 cm, on session 41. I increased the distance to approximately 4 cm on session 43, 
5 cm on session 46, 6 cm on session 15, and 7 cm on session 50 (see Figure 5). Pierre’s 
movements became smoother in session 47, but they were still somewhat erratic, 
especially compared to Bert’s movements (see below). These data indicated that Pierre 
learned to manipulate the tool successfully, even with erratic movements, at increasingly 
wider distances between the tool and the food item. I conducted 51 testing sessions, for a 
total of 816 trials, with Pierre in the first experiment. 
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Bert reached criterion faster than Pierre did. He reached criterion in session 28, 
after 448 trials, with 14 out of 16 correct (p = 0.004; see Figure 6). Once he reached 
criterion, I increased the distance between the food item and tool to around 2 cm. I 
increased the distance to approximately 4 cm starting on session 33, 5 cm on session 37, 
6 cm on session 44, and 7 cm on session 45. Points below the criterion line correspond 
with the increases in distance (see Figure 6). Like the other monkeys, Bert started out 
pulling the tool straight towards him, but he never tried to pull it into the enclosure. In 
subsequent sessions, he eventually learned to move the tool to either side, and his 
movements became smoother, even as the distance increased. Overall, these data 
indicated that Bert learned to manipulate the tool successfully, at increasingly wider 
distances between the tool and the food item. I conducted 51 testing sessions, for a total 
of 816 trials, with Bert in the first experiment. These results indicated that there were 
strong individual differences within the three monkeys, as only Bert and Pierre learned to 
successfully manipulate the tool, while Ranier did not. Also, Bert learned the task in 
fewer trials than Pierre, and did not display erratic arm movements, like Pierre.  
The goal of the first experiment was to investigate the lion-tailed macaques’ 
abilities to manipulate a rake-shaped tool, and to determine if they learned to manipulate 
the tool through insight or trial and error. In the first experiment, two of the three 
monkeys did not learn to successfully manipulate the tools to retrieve the food item. Only 
two monkeys, Bert and Pierre, learned to manipulate the tool successfully. From the 
results, it appeared that both monkeys learned to use the tool through trial and error, as 
Bert took 28 sessions, or 448 trials, to retrieve the food item significantly over chance, 
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and Pierre took 38 sessions, or 608 trials. In the first few trials of the experiment, Bert’s 
main movements included pulling the tool straight back towards his body. As the trials 
progressed, he gradually started moving the tool to the sides or away from him, as needed 
to retrieve the food item. Pierre’s main movements were also pulling the tool straight 
back towards his body, and as the trials progressed, he started erratically moving the tool 
side to side. Once Bert and Pierre reached criterion, they were also able to consistently 
retrieve the food item as it was moved farther away from the tool head. The distances 
ranged from 1 cm to a maximum of 7 cm. The results of the first experiment supported 
my first hypothesis, as they indicated that Bert and Pierre learned to manipulate the tool 
successfully and most likely had associated the tool with the highly preferred food 
reward, a prerequisite of the second experiment.  
These results can be compared with the Ishibashi et al. (2000) study with Japanese 
macaques. These researchers found that some of the Japanese macaques learned to use a 
rake-shaped tool through insight, but all of the monkeys improved their performance 
using trial and error. Similar to subjects Bert and Pierre in my experiment, over the first 
few trials of the experiment, two of the Japanese macaques learned to pull in a food item 
with the tool. Other macaques saw the tool as an obstacle to the food, and tried to move it 
out of the way, which was similar to subject Ranier. All the monkeys in the Ishibashi et 
al. (2000) study could use the tool to retrieve the food item with peak smoothness and 
performance after 2,600 trials. In contrast, subject Bert and Pierre were the only monkeys 
that learned to use the tool to retrieve a food item, and Bert had smoother arm movements 
than Pierre. However, it took the monkeys in the Ishibashi et al. (2000) study around 
   29 
1,800 trials to be able to consistently and smoothly retrieve the food item with the tool, 
while in my experiment, it took Bert and Pierre 448 trials and 608 trials, respectively. The 
reason for the reported large difference in trials to reach criterion between Japanese 
macaques and lion-tailed macaques was unclear. They might be species differences, but 
there were some other possible explanations, such as individual differences, and 
experience in previous cognitive studies. The lion-tailed macaques were experienced at 
pulling rod-like tools, which might have improved their performance in repositioning 
rake-shaped tools (Judge & Haverly, unpublished data). 
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Subjects and housing. Before the testing started, I presented just the rake tool to 
Bert and Pierre, around 10 cm away from the enclosures, to determine whether they 
would take the tool from my hand, and use it to retrieve the high-value food item resting 
on the apparatus, around 15 cm away from the enclosure. I did this 5 times. Only Bert 
took the tool from my hand. Pierre first grasped the tool in his hand, then dropped it and 
walked away. Afterwards, he ignored me and the tool completely. As a result, only Bert 
participated in experiment 2, because the monkeys had to take the tool from my hand, in 
order to retrieve the high-value reward. The enclosures were the same as in the first 
experiment.  
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Apparatus. The apparatus was the same as in the first experiment, however, the 
macaque’s view was not obstructed between trials. 
Procedures. I conducted two food preference tests with small pieces of apples 
and peanuts with Bert. I presented both food items on my apparatus, far enough away 
from each other so that Bert could only choose one. Each test had 15 trials. In the first 
test, Bert chose the peanut over the apple 12 out of 15 times, and he chose the peanut 13 
out of 15 times in the second test. Both of these were statistically significant, indicating a 
higher preference for peanuts over apples. To start a trial, I presented Bert with a choice 
between a medium value food (apple), and a rake tool that could be used to obtain a 
higher-value reward (peanut). The peanut was visible on the apparatus at the beginning of 
each trial. I presented the items, by holding one in each hand, about 20 cm apart, and 
about 30 cm away from the enclosure so the monkey could observe the choices, and let 
him observe for about 10 s (see Figure 7). The left or right positions of the tool and food 
item were pseudo-randomized, in that no more than two consecutive trials were on the 
same side. Each session had 10 trials of the tool on the right, and 10 on the left. Then, I 
moved the items to within the reach of the monkey. If he chose the food reward, the trial 
was over. If he chose the tool, I pushed the platform forward with the high-value peanut 
reward resting on it that he needed to use the tool to retrieve. There was a small delay 
(increased from around 5 s to around 10 s) between the monkey choosing, and him being 
allowed to use the tool. I started the delay at 5 s, because starting delays used in previous 
literature were similarly short (Evans & Westergaard, 2006; Szalda-Petree et al., 2004). 
While observing Bert manipulating the tool, it appeared to take him around 5 s just to 
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move the tool in order to retrieve the food item. As a result, I increased the delay from 5 s 
to 10 s in session 7, to incorporate more time in which he had to exercise self-control and 
hold on to the tool before receiving a reward. Testing took place six to seven days a week, 
and sessions consisted of 20 trials. All of the testing was videotaped to analyze the 
monkey’s movements and skill at using the rake. 
Data Analysis. According to a binomial distribution, the two-tailed probability of 
selecting the tool 15 out of 20 times would be p = 0.041, so these upper and lower 
boundaries would be statistically significant, and lower than expected by chance (alpha = 
0.05). 
Results and Discussion 
Bert reached criterion of choosing the tool over the apple piece 15 out of 20 times, 
in two consecutive sessions (p = 0.041). He reached criterion in session 7, after 150 trials, 
with 19 out of 20 correct (p < 0.001). In total, Bert had 26 sessions for a total of 520 trials 
(see Figure 8). I stopped testing after 26 sessions, because Bert had chosen the tool over 
the apple 20 out of 20 times for 7 sessions in a row. In the first session, Bert chose the 
tool and retrieved the peanut 8 out of 20 times, which although not above chance, 
indicated some degree of self-control. In the next few sessions, he dropped down to 2 out 
of 20 successful, then back to 8 out of 20 successful. In the fourth session, he dropped 
back down to 3 out of 20 correct. In session 5, he retrieved the peanut 12 out of 20, and 
started to reach criterion in session 7. My results indicated that Bert learned to select the 
tool, over the first seven sessions. 
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Bert was capable of self-control, as he chose the tool to retrieve the peanut over 
the apple piece, even after a 10 s delay. From the prior experience in the first experiment, 
Bert learned the relationship between the tool and the food item. The results of the second 
experiment supported my second hypothesis, as they indicated that Bert learned some 
form of self-control, as he chose the tool over the medium value reward significantly over 
chance in 19 sessions.  
However, some may debate that Bert was exhibiting true self-control. They might 
have argued that the tool was reinforced by the immediate retrieval of the food item in the 
first experiment, as well as the delayed retrieval of the food item in the second 
experiment, which may have led to a learned rule to always choose the tool. In fact, my 
results from the second experiment seem to rule out that a reinforced rule was learned in 
the first experiment. Like Osvath and Osvath (2008) and Judge and Essler (2013), I 
included an experiment that controlled for a learned relationship, as I presented a choice 
between the tool and a less valued food reward. If a reinforced relationship between the 
tool and the high-value food reward really occurred, the monkey would have immediately 
chosen the tool in the first trial of the second experiment, and continued to choose the 
tool, ignoring the apple. However, there was no evidence for a reinforced relationship, as 
Bert chose the apple piece in the first trial of the second experiment, and continued to 
choose the apple in most trials, until session 6, when Bert seemed to learn that the tool 
could be used to obtain the more valued reward and began to exhibit self-control. 
In the tests for experiment 2, the tool was always reinforced with a high-value 
peanut reward. Even with a delay, this pairing could have reinforced some rules to obtain 
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the high-value reward. Bert may have learned a rule to either never pick the apple, or 
always pick the non-food item. The third experiment was designed to test for these 
potential learned rules, in which I presented a choice between a medium value apple 
reward and a new non-food object.  
Experiment 3 
Method 
Subjects and housing. Bert was the only subject in this experiment, because he 
was the only monkey that completed the second experiment. The enclosures were the 
same as in the first experiment.  
Apparatus. The apparatus was the same as in the second experiment. 
Procedures. The goal of the third experiment was to test for learned associative 
rules, such as always choosing the tool, or never choosing the apple. I presented a choice 
between a medium value apple reward and a new non-food object. I conducted four 
testing sessions in the third experiment. The first session was the same as the sessions in 
the second experiment, to re-acclimate Bert to the self-control task. The second and third 
session introduced a choice between the same medium value food reward, apple, and a 
black rubber “Kong” toy, a familiar object that could not be used as a tool to retrieve the 
high-value food reward (see Figure 9). I presented the items in identical positions and 
using the same left-right presentation schedule as experiment 2. The last session was a 
repeat of the first session, to further test for associative rules. In session 2 and three, if 
Bert chose the food reward, the trial was over. If he chose the toy, I pushed the apparatus 
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with the high-value peanut reward resting on it that he could not retrieve using the toy. If 
he chose the toy, it might indicate that he learned a rule to always choose the non-food 
object, whether it was a rake tool or a “Kong” toy, in order to obtain the high-value 
peanut reward. Another possible explanation was that he may have learned to never 
choose the apple. However, if Bert chose the apple over the “Kong” toy, it would show he 
was not using this rule. The last session, when Bert could again select a functional object 
over the apple, if he chose the tool over the apple it would show he had made an 
association between the tool object and the retrieval of the high-value food reward, not 
just a “select an object” rule.  
Data Analysis. The data analysis was the same as in the second experiment. The 
two-tailed probability of selecting the tool 15 out of 20 times in sessions 1 and 4, and the 
medium value food item over the nonfunctional object 15 out of 20 times in sessions 2 
and 3, would be p = 0.041, so these upper and lower boundaries would be statistically 
significant, and lower than expected by chance (alpha = 0.05). 
Results and Discussion 
In the first session to get re-acclimated to the tool and apple piece choice task, 
Bert met criterion and chose the tool 20 out of 20 trials (p < 0.001). In session 2, with the 
choice between the apple piece and the toy, he chose the apple 18 out of 20 trials (p < 
0.001), in the third session, he chose the apple 20 out of 20 trials (p < 0.001). In the last 
session, Bert chose the tool over the apple 19 out of 20 trials (p < 0.001). These 
statistically significant results indicated that Bert was not using simple associative rules. 
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He did not learn rules to always choose the non-food object, or never choose the apple, to 
obtain the reward in experiment 2. Furthermore, he did not learn rules during testing in 
experiment 3, to choose the apple, as selecting the non-food item does not lead to 
obtaining the high-value food reward. Overall, Bert’s responses were different between 
the tool and the toy, indicating that he did not learn any simple associative rules, but 
associated the rake tool specifically with obtaining the high-value reward, which 
provided further support for my second hypothesis. 
  General Discussion  
The results of the first experiment documented that lion-tailed macaques have the 
capacity for tool use acquisition. The results of the first experiment could be compared to 
similar tool use acquisition studies on other primate species. Bert and Pierre, the 
successful individuals in my first experiment, reached criterion in session 28, after 448 
trials, and session 38, after 608 trials, respectively. These data were comparable to 
Ishibashi et al. (2000), as the Japanese macaques in their study started to consistently and 
smoothly retrieve the food item with the tool around day 13, after 2,600 trials. In their 
study with gibbons, Cunningham et al. (2005) reported that all of the gibbons learned to 
manipulate and pull in the food reward within 90 s. However, the gibbons only had to 
pull the tool towards them and not reposition the tool, as the food item was always in 
front of the tool head, which is not exactly comparable to my experiment. Yamazaki et al. 
(2011) reported a much higher number of trials needed to reach criterion in marmosets, 
from around 7,000 to around 11,000 trials. These differences in acquisition of tool use 
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between lion-tailed macaques and marmosets might be expected, because of previous 
reports of differences among New World and Old World primates (Cunningham et al., 
2006; Ishibashi et al., 2000; Spaulding & Hauser, 2005; Yamazaki et al., 2011). Overall, 
my results are in line with my hypothesis, that lion-tailed macaques’ performance on tool 
use acquisition tasks would be similar to other macaque species, like Japanese macaques, 
and better than some New World primates, like marmosets. However, my study included 
only two lion-tailed macaque subjects, which meant that my conclusions might not be 
generalizable to the entire species. As a result, it is difficult to make definitive 
comparisons among species, based on my data. 
The results of the first experiment also indicated that there were strong individual 
differences among the three macaques, as only Bert and Pierre learned to successfully 
manipulate the tool to obtain the food item. The other macaque pulled the tool straight 
towards him. Other tool use acquisition studies have reported marked individual 
differences in common marmosets, Japanese macaques, and capuchin monkeys (Evans & 
Westergaard, 2006; Ishibashi et al., 2000; Yamazaki et al., 2011). For example, in the 
study with Japanese macaques, two of the monkeys seemed to learn the repositioning task 
faster than the other two, because they quickly learned to pull in the food item (Ishibashi 
et al., 2000). The other two acted as if the tool was an obstacle to the food item, and tried 
to move the tool out of the way. The lion-tailed macaques in my experiment had similar 
individual differences. All three of the lion-tailed macaques started out pulling the tool 
straight towards them, but two monkeys, Bert and Pierre, eventually learned to maneuver 
the tool head behind the food item to retrieve it. The other monkey, Ranier, never learned 
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to reposition the tool to retrieve the food item. Possible reasons for the individual 
differences include differences in cognitive ability and coordination of movement. Such 
individual differences are common in cognitive tasks, but even though only two 
macaques demonstrated tool use acquisition, the results of the first experiment were 
significant because they documented the capability in lion-tailed macaques, a species not 
yet tested. 
In the second experiment, Bert learned that he could forego a medium-value food 
item and choose a tool, which, after a 10 s delay, he could use to retrieve a high-value 
food item. He reached criterion in session 7, after 150 trials. His performance was 
comparable to other species’ performance levels in self-control exchange tasks, which 
demonstrates support for my hypothesis. The Beran and Evans (2012) study of 
chimpanzees was most comparable to my study, as they incorporated a 10 to 15 s delay 
between the chimpanzees selecting the lexigram token over a lower-value food and 
exchanging the lexigram for the corresponding higher-value food item. Two of the three 
chimpanzees learned to select a token over a low-value food that led to a more preferred 
food, within 120 trials. Judge and Essler (2013) also incorporated token exchange in their 
tests of self-control with capuchin monkeys, demonstrating that monkeys would forgo an 
immediate reward and select a token that could be exchanged for a higher-value reward. 
However, theirs was not a demanding test of self-control because they did not incorporate 
a delay between the monkeys selecting the token and obtaining the corresponding food 
item. The ability to delay after token collection may reflect species differences, and, 
perhaps, differences in New World and Old World primates (Beran & Evans, 2012; Judge 
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& Essler, 2013). 
In addition, these New World and Old World primate studies included control 
testing to eliminate the possibility of reinforced associative rules (Beran & Evans, 2012; 
Judge & Essler, 2013). I incorporated a control test in the third experiment, most similar 
to the “bartering down” phase in the Judge and Essler (2013) study. From the testing in 
the first two experiments, Bert could have learned rules to either always choose the 
object, or never choose the apple. In the control tests, I presented choices between a 
medium value apple reward and a new non-food toy object, to test for these reinforced 
rules. Bert chose the apple over the nonfunctional toy object significantly over chance, 
which indicated that he did not learn these rules. These results and the conclusions of 
Judge and Essler (2013) indicated that both lion-tailed macaques and capuchins were not 
using simple rules of association in these tasks. Overall, the results of my study were 
consistent with Beran and Evans (2012) and Judge and Essler (2013), as they provided 
evidence that the self-control abilities of lion-tailed macaques in an exchange task were 
comparable to chimpanzees and capuchins. 
My self-control experiment was unique in that a macaque would forgo a medium-
value reward for a tool that could be used to obtain a high-value reward. Lion-tailed 
macaques exhibited self-control, as Bert would forgo a low-value reward to use a tool to 
obtain a high-value reward. Other studies have used similar paradigms that include the 
task of forgoing an immediate lesser reward to obtain a greater value reward. As 
mentioned, chimpanzees and capuchins would forgo a lower-value reward for a token to 
be exchanged for a higher-value reward. In other self-control studies, animals, including 
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chimpanzees, could choose to forgo an immediate lesser-value reward for a delayed, 
higher-value reward in a delay choice task (Osvath & Osvath, 2008). Other animals, like 
chimpanzees, rhesus macaques, long-tailed macaques, tamarins, marmosets, and 
capuchins, could choose to forgo a small quantity of rewards to obtain a larger quantity of 
rewards in a delay choice task (Addessi, Paglieri, & Focaroli, 2011; Beran et al., 2014; 
Rosati, Stevens, & Hauser, 2006; Stevens, Hallinan, & Hauser, 2005; Szalda-Petree et al., 
2004; Tobin et al., 1996). In delay maintenance tasks, chimpanzees, capuchins, and 
rhesus macaques could choose to forgo an immediate lesser-value reward for a delayed, 
higher-value reward (Beran et al, 1999; Evans & Beran, 2007; Evans & Westergaard, 
2006). Other animals, like chimpanzees, orangutans, rhesus macaques, long-tailed 
macaques, Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana), squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus), 
tamarins, marmosets, and capuchins, could choose to forgo a small quantity of rewards to 
obtain a larger quantity of rewards. (Anderson, Kuroshima, & Fujita, 2010; Beran, 2002; 
Beran & Evans 2006, 2009; Beran et al., 2014; Drapier, Chauvin, Dufour, Uhlrich, & 
Thierry, 2005; Dufour, Pelé, Sterck, & Thierry, 2007; Evans & Beran, 2007; Pelé, 
Dufour, Micheletta, & Thierry, 2010; Pelé, Micheletta, Uhlrich, Thierry, & Dufour, 2011; 
Ramseyer, Pelé, Dufour, Chauvin, & Thierry, 2006; Stevens, Rosati, Ross, & Hauser, 
2005). My experiment added the novel component of a tool to test self-control, in which 
the monkeys needed to choose between the medium value reward and a tool to obtain a 
higher-value reward in the future. This successful paradigm could be incorporated into 
future studies of self-control.  
My second and third experiments focused on investigating self-control, a concept 
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that is a component of planning. Again, planning is explained by two central concepts. In 
order for an animal to plan, it must display response inhibition, or self-control, in that it 
gives up immediate drives to obtain rewards in the future, and mental time travel, which 
is the ability to place itself mentally forwards or backwards in time (Osvath & Osvath, 
2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008). I focused on self-control, as it is difficult to 
measure flexible cognition about the future in non-human animals, just based on 
observable behavior. Studies of self-control can only investigate one key concept of 
planning, but positive results may indicate a rudimentary ability to plan across many 
species. 
Overall, my research examined tool use acquisition in lion-tailed macaques. Two 
of the monkeys, Bert and Pierre, were successful in learning to manipulate the tool, 
which indicated some ability to monitor their own arm movements. In terms of tool use 
acquisition, in which there are very few studies that have tested it directly, lion-tailed 
macaques fell where expected phylogenetically. Bert and Pierre learned to efficiently use 
a rake shaped tool in around 448 trials and 608 trials respectively, which is comparable to 
Japanese macaques’ capacity for tool use (Ishibashi et al., 2000). In addition, it appeared 
that marmosets required many more trials to reach criterion than lion-tailed macaques 
(Yamazaki et al., 2011). These studies might indicate an evolutionary difference in 
capacity for tool use acquisition among New World and Old World primates. 
Bert also learned to choose the rake tool more often than immediate rewards, 
which indicated the capacity for self-control. In terms of self-control, lion-tailed 
macaques could be compared to other primate species. Bert learned to exhibit self-control 
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after 150 trials. In a similar task, two capuchin monkeys chose high-value tokens over the 
lower-value food in a token exchange task (Judge & Essler, 2013). Beran and Evans 
(2012) used a token exchange method in chimpanzees. They found that two of the three 
chimpanzees learned to make the response that led to the more preferred food, within 30 
sessions, or 120 trials. Szalda-Petree et al. (2004) reported that rhesus macaques 
exhibited self-control, as two monkeys learned to choose the delayed, larger reward over 
the immediate, smaller reward within 180 trials, and the third monkey learned the task 
within 250 trials. Evans and Beran (2007) reported similar results with rhesus macaques 
in their study, and Tobin et al. (1996) reported similar results with long-tailed macaques 
in their experiments. From these studies, it appeared that lion-tailed macaques’ 
performance on self-control tasks fit where expected in relation to other primate species. 
It appears that lion-tailed macaques perform similarly to capuchins, rhesus macaques, 
long-tailed macaques, and chimpanzees. It seemed that the capacity for self-control did 
not vary widely among New World and Old World primates. Overall, my results 
supported my expectations of lion-tailed macaques’ performances on tool use acquisition 
tasks and self-control tasks, and the phylogenetic relationship to these tasks in other 
species. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. (A) Tool used in sessions with subject Bert. (B) Tool used in sessions with 
subjects Pierre and Ranier. 
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Figure 2. (A) Apparatus with opaque Plexiglas. (B) Apparatus without opaque Plexiglas. 
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Figure 3. Testing Conditions. The “X” indicates the position of the monkey (A) Tool-
food item orientation 1, with the tool in the center, to the right of the food item. (B) Tool-
food item orientation 2, with the tool in the center, to the left of the food item. (C). Tool-
food item orientation 3, with the tool to the left, and the food item in the center. (D) Tool-
food item orientation 4, with the tool to the right and the food item in the center.  
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Figure 4. Performance of subject Ranier in Experiment 1. The y-axis represents the 
number of trials that Ranier retrieved the food item. The horizontal line indicates criterion 
for success, 13 out of 16, or 81.3% (p = 0.021). 
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Figure 5. Performance of subject Pierre in Experiment 1. The y-axis represents the 
number of trials that Pierre retrieved the food item. The horizontal line indicates criterion 
for success, 13 out of 16, or 81.3% (p = 0.021). The vertical blue lines indicate the trials 
in which I increased the distance between the tool and food item, and the distance is in 
cm along the top. 
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Figure 6. Performance of subject Bert in Experiment 1. The y-axis represents the number 
of trials that Bert retrieved the food item. The horizontal line indicates criterion for 
success, 13 out of 16, or 81.3% (p = 0.021). The vertical blue lines indicate the trials in 
which I increased the distance between the tool and food item, and the distance is in cm 
along the top.  
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Figure 7. (A) Presentation of choice between the tool and the apple piece. (B) Subject 
Bert selecting the tool. 
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Figure 8. Performance of subject Bert in Experiment 2.  The y-axis represents the 
number of trials that he chose the tool. The horizontal line indicates criterion for success, 
15 out of 20, or 75.0% (p = 0.041). The vertical blue line indicates when I increased the 
delay interval from 5 s to 10 s. 
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Figure 9. (A) Presentation of choice between an apple and the “Kong” toy. (B) Subject 
Bert selecting the apple piece. 
